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Reply to Miriam Baer and Michael
Doucette’s Reviews of Two Models of
Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases
Jenia I. Turner* & Allison D. Redlich**
The comments by Michael Doucette1 and Miriam Baer2 to our
recent article about pre-plea discovery in Virginia and North
Carolina suggest that our findings have generated interest
among practitioners and other scholars. This is encouraging to
us. But we take this opportunity to respond to Doucette and Baer
for two reasons. First, although our article already addressed in
considerable detail the methodological concerns that Doucette
and Baer raise, we want to briefly restate that discussion here, to
prevent confusion among readers who have not read our original
article. Second, we are compelled to respond to several points by
Doucette that reflect a misunderstanding of our findings and our
arguments and to note several places in which he
mischaracterizes those findings and arguments. We conclude by
embracing the call for further research by Baer.
As Baer notes, our survey fills an important gap in the
literature on criminal discovery, which has largely lacked
empirical grounding and has often focused on trial discovery

*
Amy Abboud Ware Centennial Professor in Criminal Law, SMU
Dedman School of Law.
**
Professor in Criminology, Law and Society, George Mason University.
1. Doucette labels his piece “Virginia Prosecutors’ Response,” uses the
collective pronoun “we” throughout, and states that his comments are “on behalf
of Virginia’s prosecutors.” See generally Michael R. Doucette, Virginia
Prosecutors’ Response to Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases:
An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 415, 416 (2016).
However, he does not explain whether and in what sense his piece represents
the views of all Virginia prosecutors and does not explain which other
prosecutors, if any, have contributed to his response. Therefore, we attribute his
reply to him individually.
2. Miriam H. Baer, Some Skepticism about Criminal Discovery
Empiricism, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 347 (2016).
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rather than discovery before a guilty plea.3 While welcoming this
empirical approach, Baer raises some concerns about
methodology, focusing above all on the response rate to the
survey.4 Doucette likewise criticizes the response rate, but has
other concerns about our methods as well.
We begin with Doucette’s first criticism—that we examined
perceptions of discovery rather than discovery practices directly.5
We acknowledged this in our article. Indeed, this was the whole
point of our project: rather than engaging in a theoretical
discussion of proper discovery practices—an exercise that has
been ably accomplished elsewhere—we sought to examine the
subjective perceptions of actual practitioners on both sides. We
believe this perspective to be important and largely missing from
existing scholarship on the issue.6 As we explained, “defense
attorneys and prosecutors are the key actors in discovery and
have first-hand experience with most of its effects. Their views
and perceptions therefore offer an indicator of what really
happens at this critical stage of the criminal process.”7 The
reliance on perceptions by those directly engaged in the process
being studied is a well-recognized research method of social
scientists.8 Further, a key objective of our survey was to assess
the advantages and disadvantages of open-file discovery
practices. In analyzing this question, the reported experience of
those who are familiar with such policies (North Carolina) and
those who are less so (Virginia) is undoubtedly relevant.
3. See id. at 348.
4. See id. at 353.
5. Doucette, supra note 1, at 416.
6. See Baer, supra note 2, at 348 (“They [Turner and Redlich] employ a
survey-based empirical approach that has been largely missing in this debate.”).
7. Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery
in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 315
(2016).
8. Surveys are among the most common research design methods. See,
e.g., Fred N. Kerlinger & Howard B. Lee, FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH 600 (4th ed. 2000)
Survey research is considered to be a branch of social scientific
research . . . . Its procedures and methods have been developed
mostly by psychologists, sociologists, economists, political scientists,
and statisticians. . . . The social scientific nature of survey research is
revealed by the nature of its variables, which can be classified as
sociological facts, opinions, and attitudes.
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We are not the only ones to have sought the perspectives of
practicing attorneys in evaluating the merits of open-file
discovery. For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia itself
relied heavily on public comments by prosecutors and defense
attorneys when studying the need and desirability of discovery
reform in Virginia.9 Indeed, as then-President of the Virginia
Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys, in 2012, Doucette
contributed a public comment to the court, relying for his
argument entirely on the perceptions and experiences of himself
and other prosecutors.10 Consideration of such commentary is
routine for public decision-making bodies throughout the United
States, even when it is gathered and received in far less
systematic fashion than were our survey responses.11
Relatedly, Doucette also suggested that using the word
“empirical” in our article title was a misnomer, stating that this
term “connotes that the scientific method was used.”12 Doucette
conflates these two terms. “Empirical” simply means “based on,
concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather
than theory or pure logic.”13 Our survey most certainly collected
9. See Doucette, supra note 1, at 426 (citing order by Supreme Court of
Virginia indicating that the Court considered public comments in its
consideration of discovery reform proposals); see also SUPREME COURT OF VA.,
REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY RULES TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE &
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VA. xv (Dec. 2, 2014).
10. See Letter from Michael Doucette, President, Va. Ass’n of
Commonwealth Att’y, Public Comment Concerning Proposed Rule Change to
Wit: Virginia Rule of Court 3A:11 (Discovery and Inspection: Criminal) at 4
(Dec. 12, 2012) (opposing open-file by noting witness safety concerns and
pointing as evidence that “[o]ne Virginia prosecutor abandoned his practice of
providing a copy of everything in his file to the defense when he learned that
copies of the materials thus provided were being passed around at meetings of
the Bloods street gang”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also id. (asserting, without any evidentiary support, that “[t]he collection,
processing and indexing of materials and other related workload increases,
which would be required by this version of 3A:11, would significantly impair the
productivity and reduce the services provided by any offices”).
11. More questionably, in his response to our article, Doucette effectively
substitutes his own anecdotal perceptions of the costs and benefits of open-file
for those of hundreds of criminal justice practitioners from Virginia and North
Carolina who participated in our study. Doucette, supra note 1, at 427–32.
12. Id. at 416.
13. Empirical,
ENGLISH
OXFORD
LIVING
DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/empirical (last visited Nov. 16, 2016)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Empirical, OXFORD
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data (experiences), and it sought information about what is was
happening in the real world, in the opinions of the actors closest
to the process. It was not based on theory or pure logic. Our title
was accurate.
Notably, our article does not simply compare the perceptions
of Virginia defense attorneys to those of Virginia prosecutors.
Instead, much of it focuses on the comparative experiences of
Virginia prosecutors and North Carolina prosecutors—
specifically, the fact that North Carolina prosecutors report a
significantly higher rate of pre-plea disclosure of most categories
of evidence. Therefore, Doucette’s point that defense counsel may
not always know what evidence a prosecutor withholds (an issue
we also address in the article) does not undercut the findings of
our study.
Next, both Doucette and Baer express a concern that our
sample is not representative and that our response rate is low.
We addressed this issue directly in our article:
Like most surveys of this nature, our sample is nonrepresentative, as we did not randomly select individuals to
participate, and persons self-selected to examine and complete
the survey. Although we attempted to reach out broadly to the
populations of attorneys in Virginia and North Carolina, our
results may not generalize to all attorneys in these states
because of the non-representativeness of our sample.
Nonetheless, our response rates and our completion rate of
75% are quite comparable to, or exceed, rates from similar
surveys.14

Baer points to the low response rate as an argument for
supplementing our survey with more empirical studies,
employing
different methods and
studying
additional
jurisdictions.15 But Doucette takes this argument a step further
and claims that the low response rate renders our study invalid.16
While we agree with Baer about the need for further research, we
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining empirical as a study “[t]hat pursues
knowledge by means of direct observation, investigation, or experiment (as
distinct from deductive reasoning, abstract theorizing, or speculation)”).
14. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 321.
15. See Baer, supra note 2, at 358 (stating Baer’s hope that others will
continue to study open-file’s “effect on criminal justice”).
16. See Doucette, supra note 1, at 420.
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take issue with Doucette’s claim that the low response rate
invalidates our findings.
Although one might always wish for a higher response rate,
ours was similar to or higher than those obtained in other studies
of prosecutors and defense attorneys.17 Indeed, we believe our
survey to be the most comprehensive to date of the perceptions of
prosecutors and defense attorneys about discovery issues. There
are several reasons for this: 1) the response rate was higher than
those of two of the three other discovery-related surveys;18 2) our
17. For example, in a study surveying defense attorneys about their choices
in guilty plea contexts, Vanessa Edkins had an eleven percent response rate in
the first round of surveys sent (national sample) and a fourteen percent
response rate in the second round (Florida sample). See Vanessa A. Edkins,
Defense Attorney Plea Recommendations and Client Race: Does Zealous
Representation Apply Equally to All?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 417 (2011)
(addressing the role of the defense attorney and examining whether disparities
in sentence length and incarceration rates between African Americans and
Caucasian Americans are in part due to the plea bargains that defense
attorneys recommend to these clients to accept). Similarly, Kathy Pezdek and
Matthew O’Brien surveyed defense attorneys and prosecutors in California and,
in discussing their low response rate, commented that “[a]nyone doing research
with practicing attorneys is aware of the difficulty getting them to participate.”
Kathy Pezdek & Matthew O’Brien, Plea Bargaining and Appraisals of
Eyewitness Evidence by Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys, 20 PSYCHOL., CRIME
& L. 222, 237 (2014).
18. See TEX. CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS ASS’N & MANAGING TO EXCELLENCE CORP.,
THE COST OF COMPLIANCE: A LOOK AT THE FISCAL IMPACT AND PROCESS CHANGES
OF THE MICHAEL MORTON ACT 4 (2015) [hereinafter TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL
MORTON ACT] (showing participation at around eight percent and using a nonrandom sample); see also N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, DISCOVERY IN NEW YORK
CRIMINAL COURTS: SURVEY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2006) (using a nonrandom sample and noting that 750 surveys were mailed, and 131 responses
were used to write the report, resulting in a seventeen and one half percent
response rate, although it is unclear whether this percentage included only
completed surveys, or partially-completed surveys as well). An exception to this
is the survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center. Although it was also a
non-random sample, it received responses from thirty-one percent of private
defense attorneys and forty-seven percent of public defenders, forty-eight
percent of active district judges, and ninety-one percent of U.S. Attorney’s
offices. An important limitation of the survey was that it did not survey
individual prosecutors, but collected responses from an office as a whole.
Furthermore, it was limited to one jurisdiction—the federal system—and only
asked about disclosure of Brady evidence pre-trial, rather than about discovery
practices more broadly, including pre-plea. LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., A SUMMARY
OF RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES: FINAL
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 8 (2011).
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survey studied prosecutors as well as defense attorneys, unlike
some surveys, which focus on defense attorneys only;19 and 3) it is
the only survey that directly compared the experiences of
practitioners in two states with different rules, thereby including
a prosecutor-to-prosecutor comparison across states, rather than
simply comparing prosecutors to defense attorneys.20
Doucette takes his critique further, claiming that we “did not
attempt to collect data from a representative sample,”21 that we
“made no effort to make sure [our] sample was representative,”22
and that we “intended that respondents to the survey selfselect.”23 These statements are simply false. As one of the 120
Commonwealth Attorneys in Virginia, Mr. Doucette was in the
group whom we contacted for participation and advice on
conducting our survey.24 We therefore regret to see that he did
not appreciate the many efforts we undertook to maximize the
size and representativeness of our sample. We contacted several
statewide associations with a request to obtain the names and
emails of all Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors so that we
could directly recruit the population of prosecutors in these states
and obtain a random sample. But no association was able or
willing to provide us with such a list. It was only then that we
turned to the survey method described in the article.
As our article documents, we attempted to reach the broadest
possible selection of attorneys and obtain the highest possible
response rate. We did so by: 1) keeping our survey relatively
19. See N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, supra note 18, at 7. Two of the studies
did survey both prosecutors and defense attorneys (and judges), but they
examined only one jurisdiction—Texas and the federal system, respectively.
Moreover, the study of the federal system did not address pre-plea discovery and
only asked about disclosure of Brady evidence pre-trial. See TCDLA REPORT ON
MICHAEL MORTON ACT, supra note 18, at iv–v (examining the Texas criminal
justice system exclusively); see also HOOPER ET AL., supra note 18, at 1–2
(examining views about pretrial Brady disclosure in the federal criminal justice
system).
20. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 18, at 1–2 (focusing exclusively on the
federal jurisdiction); see also N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, supra note 18, at 7
(studying New York City exclusively); see also TCDLA REPORT ON MICHAEL
MORTON ACT, supra note 18, at iv–v (focusing exclusively on Texas).
21. Doucette, supra note 1, at 417 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
24. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 317.
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short; 2) keeping the survey confidential; 3) sending repeated
reminders to our contacts; and 4) in the case of prosecutors,
contacting them in two ways—through statewide associations of
prosecutors (who in turn sent our solicitation to prosecutors
throughout the state) and through individual chief prosecutors
(whom we asked to send our survey to their staff prosecutors).25
We note here that Doucette claims that we “asked elected
prosecutors in Virginia . . . to help them identify assistants in
their own office who would also participate,” and thereby accuses
us of “snowball sampling.”26 This is inaccurate. We did not ask
chief prosecutors to selectively identify other assistants in their
office to participate, but instead requested that they send the
survey to all prosecutors in their offices.27
Doucette (but not Baer) also finds fault with our comparative
approach. He claims that North Carolina and Virginia are not
sufficiently legally alike to be worth comparing.28 Scholars of
comparative law are likely to find this criticism startling, as
comparative law typically studies legal systems that are much
more dissimilar than those of North Carolina and Virginia. More
to the point, Doucette’s criticism is unsupported. He mentions
several legal differences between Virginia and North Carolina,
but fails to describe how any of them have any bearing on
discovery practices. For example, he mentions that Virginia has
jury sentencing, while North Carolina does not; and that judges
in Virginia are appointed, while those in North Carolina are
elected.29 He does not explain why either jury sentencing or
judicial selection has any direct or significant relationship to
discovery practice. In fact, evidence from other states suggests
that there is no such relationship. For example Texas has jury
sentencing, like Virginia, but it is an open-file state, like North
Carolina, undermining Doucette’s implication that jury
sentencing somehow stands in the way of open-file.30 The same
25. Id. at 316–18.
26. Doucette, supra note 1, at 418.
27. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 317.
28. See Doucette, supra note 1, at 420–21.
29. Id. at 421.
30. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07 (providing defendants with the
right to have a jury assess the punishment); see also id. art. 39.14 (mandating
open-file discovery).
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goes for appointed judges—like Virginia, Colorado has appointed
judges, yet that state has open-file discovery, suggesting that the
appointment of judges does not prevent the flourishing of liberal
discovery rules.31
We next highlight several places in which Doucette’s
response seriously mischaracterizes our methods and findings.
Doucette first claims that “the article never tells us what is
meant by ‘open file’ discovery.”32 In fact, we do explain our use of
this term, both in the survey instrument and in the article. In the
survey, we define open-file as “a system under which the
defendant has access to the entire prosecutorial file, except for
attorney work product and information exempt from disclosure by
a protective order.”33 In the article, we provide further detail, and
would here refer the reader to the four-page section II(B), entitled
“Beyond the Baseline: Two Models of Discovery in Criminal
Cases.”34 There we explain the wide spectrum of disclosure
requirements that vary from state to state, and note that we have
identified seventeen states that can be understood to follow an
“open-file” model.35 As we wrote:
While states that follow this [open-file] model differ somewhat
in the scope of information they require to be disclosed, the
chief characteristics of their discovery rules are similar. The
prosecution is generally required to disclose, at some point
after arraignment, either its entire case file (minus work
product) or a broad set of evidentiary materials that
encompasses nearly everything in the file (minus work
product). The key feature of such liberal discovery is that it
presumptively requires the disclosure of witness names,
witness statements, and police reports.36

Appendix B to our article also contained tables showing the many
specific differences among discovery rules in the fifty states,
including variations in timing requirements and disclosure of
31. See COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 24 (providing for the appointment of
judges). But cf. id. § 25 (providing for retention elections); see also COLO. R.
CRIM. PROC. 16 (mandating open-file discovery).
32. Doucette, supra note 1, at 422.
33. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 305.
34. Id. at 302–06.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 303.
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witness names, witness statements, and police reports.37 In short,
our survey and our article did not fail to explain terminology.
Doucette also asserts that we “do not include the survey
given to defense attorneys” and we “do not explain that
omission.”38 In fact, we explain in the article that “[t]he defense
attorney survey (not reproduced here) was largely the same,
although the questions were rephrased to ask about what defense
attorneys believed to be prosecutors’ practices of disclosure in
their jurisdiction.”39 Because the prosecutor and defense surveys
were nearly identical, apart from this different phrasing of the
questions which acknowledges that defense attorneys receive,
rather than disclose the evidence we were asking about, it would
have been duplicative to include both surveys (each of which was
fourteen pages long) in our article.40
Next, Doucette inaccurately asserts that “[i]n North
Carolina, prosecutors reported significantly lower rates of
disclosure than Virginia prosecutors.”41 It appears that Doucette
misunderstood the conclusions of our survey. In fact, the opposite
was true: across most categories, North Carolina prosecutors
reported significantly higher rates of disclosure than their
Virginia counterparts.42 As we explain in the article, this is true
with respect to the pre-plea disclosure of critical items such as codefendants’ statements, witness names, witness statements,
materials related to identification procedures, and police
reports.43 Contrary to Doucette’s claim, “[t]he difference is
statistically significant when we compare the responses of
Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors as well as the responses
of defense attorneys from each state.”44

37. See id. Appendix B (displaying the “Table of Select Discovery Rules by
Jurisdiction”).
38. Doucette, supra note 1, at 416.
39. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 316 n.141.
40. Id.
41. Doucette, supra note 1, at 425.
42. See, e.g., Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, Table 2a (showing the
statistical difference between North Carolina’s and Virginia’s rates of disclosure
as reported by prosecutors in felony cases).
43. Id. at 325.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
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Perhaps this fundamental misunderstanding of our findings
contributes to Doucette’s claim that we “carry an inherent bias”
in favor of defense attorneys.45 Doucette bases his claim about our
alleged bias—a term he uses repeatedly and, in our view,
insupportably—on two key points: 1) our lack of personal law
enforcement experience;46 and 2) our interpretation of certain
responses by Virginia prosecutors, which he claims we
characterize as misleading.47 Doucette states that because we
“are not practicing lawyers and have no experience in law
enforcement, [our] apparent bias causes [us] to make . . . biased
conclusions that are not based in fact or evidence.”48 We note here
that we are neither prosecutors nor defense attorneys, and
therefore, by definition have no professional bias with respect to
either. If anything, our lack of a direct stake in the outcome of
discovery reform debates makes us more objective than those who
are “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.”49 We leave to the reader’s judgment whether Doucette’s
own role as a prosecutor50 and past role as head of the Virginia
Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys51 leaves him more or
less vulnerable to the kinds of biases of which he accuses us. We
do note that our survey suggests that his apparent skepticism
about certain aspects of open-file discovery is not shared by most
prosecutors in North Carolina, or by most defense attorneys in
either state.52
To address Doucette’s more specific accusations, nowhere in
the article do we suggest that “prosecutors provided misleading

45. Doucette, supra note 1, at 424.
46. Id. at 425.
47. See id. at 424 (“[T]he authors suggest that prosecutors provided
misleading responses and therefore discount some of the data collected by their
survey.”).
48. Id. at 425.
49. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (explaining why,
as a rule, a neutral and detached magistrate should review probable cause
determinations underlying searches and seizures by law enforcement agents).
50. See Doucette, supra note 1, at 415 (describing Michael Doucette’s
current job as the “Commonwealth’s Attorney, City of Lynchburg”).
51. Letter from Michael Doucette, President, Va. Ass’n of Commonwealth
Att’y, supra note 10.
52. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 359–72.
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responses,”53 and we never “openly dismiss reports from
prosecutors as being false.”54 Doucette specifically objects to our
statement that “consciously or unconsciously, some Virginia
prosecutors may have been eager to show that they are disclosing
Brady material at high rates and that there is no pressing need
for reforming the rules.”55 This statement does not express
disbelief in the prosecutors’ responses. Rather, it develops one of
several explanations as to why, with respect to disclosure of
certain Brady evidence, Virginia prosecutors are reporting
similar or somewhat higher rates of disclosure than their North
Carolina prosecutors.56 Because these responses departed from
the overall pattern we found when comparing the pre-plea
disclosure rates of North Carolina and Virginia prosecutors,57 we
put forth several plausible interpretations,58 including the one
that Doucette perceives as “biased.”59 It should hardly be
controversial to suggest that one’s views about an issue might
have been affected by having entered the fray as an advocate.
Given the heavy advocacy by prosecutors against discovery
reform through public comments to the Virginia Supreme Court
in the year before our study was conducted, 60 we believe that this
is a plausible interpretation of the finding..
Doucette also incorrectly asserts that we “openly dismiss
reports from prosecutors [about witness safety concerns] as being
false.”61 In fact, our article quotes in full the two responses by
Virginia prosecutors we received that referenced specific cases of
witness intimidation or assaults following disclosure of witness53. Doucette, supra note 1, at 424.
54. Id. at 425.
55. Id. at 424 (citing Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 337).
56. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at Table 3a.
57. See Id. Table 2a.
58. Id. at 333–38.
59. See id. at 424 (“Because the issue was so politically sensitive at the
time . . . consciously or unconsciously, some Virginia prosecutors may have been
eager to show that they are disclosing Brady material at high rates and that
there is no pressing need for reforming the rules.”).
60. See, e.g., Virginia Ass’n of Commonwealth’s Attorneys (VACA), Public
Comment on the Report of the Special Committee on Criminal Discovery Rules,
June 29, 2015 [hereinafter 2015 VACA Letter] (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
61. Doucette, supra note 1, at 425.
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related information.62 Nowhere do we suggest that these reports
are untrue or irrelevant. We do note the fact that in North
Carolina, prosecutors rarely reference witness intimidation and
assaults as a major disadvantage of open-file.63 As we point out,
“of the six [North Carolina] prosecutors who identified witness
intimidation as a major disadvantage of open-file, only three gave
more specific responses” and none of these responses directly
stated that open-file led to an assault to witnesses.64 When we
later comment on the risk of witness intimidation, we note that
“[a]lthough a number of Virginia prosecutors feared this
consequence of open-file and had even experienced it, neither
North Carolina prosecutors nor North Carolina defense attorneys
identified witness safety as a significant concern.”65 In short, far
from “openly dismiss[ing]” reports from Virginia prosecutors
about witness threats, we directly acknowledge them. And while
we note that North Carolina practitioners do not perceive witness
safety to be a significant risk of open-file discovery, we conclude
our article by calling for further empirical study of this
question.66 It should go without saying that we agree that
concerns about witness safety and witness intimidation are
always important in our justice system. Indeed, every open-file
discovery system of which we are aware, including North
Carolina’s, provides for special measures designed to protect
witness safety.67 In North Carolina, for example, prosecutors do
not need to disclose the identity of confidential informants68
62. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 359.
63. See id. (“By contrast, only 10.3% (6 out of 58) of North Carolina
prosecutors believed that witness intimidation was a significant disadvantage of
open-file discovery.”).
64. One respondent said that he “had one case where retaliation occurred.
A ‘snitch’ was able to be identified by the information in the file and he was
later beaten up. I don’t know if that outcome would have been any different if I
had waited to give discovery out, but I doubt it.” Turner & Redlich, supra note 7,
at 360 (citing Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Pre-Plea Discovery Practices:
A Survey of North Carolina Prosecutors, Question No. 19, Respondent No. 62
(2014)).
65. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
66. See id. at 384 (“[F]urther empirical study, surveying witnesses
themselves, would be the optimal means of assessing the actual effects of openfile on witness intimidation.”).
67. Id. at 304.
68. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15A-904(a1) (West 2011) (providing that
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(other than as required under Brady) and prosecutors can request
that the court issue a protective order to prevent the disclosure of
witness information that might jeopardize the witness’s safety.69
In his thoughts about where discovery reform is heading,
Doucette also discusses his own experience serving on the
Virginia Supreme Court Special Committee on Criminal
Discovery Rules. That Committee recommended “broader and
earlier discovery,”70 but the Virginia Supreme Court rejected the
recommendation, which was opposed by law enforcement
groups.71 Doucette criticizes the Committee for not distinguishing
between statute- or rule-based discovery and constitutionallymandated exculpatory evidence.72 He notes that wrongful
convictions have occurred only when prosecutors failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence.73 From this, he concludes that there is no
need to require discovery beyond what Brady v. Maryland74
already requires.75 Here, he ignores two critical points relevant to
discovery reform.

prosecutors are “not required to disclose the identity of a confidential informant
unless the disclosure is otherwise required by law”).
69. See id. § 15A-908(a) (“Upon written motion of a party . . . the court may
at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred,
or may make other appropriate orders.”); see also id. § 15-903(a3) (“Names of
witnesses shall not be subject to disclosure if the prosecuting attorney certifies
in writing and under seal to the court that to do so may subject the witnesses or
others to physical or substantial economic harm or coercion, or that there is
other particularized, compelling need not to disclose.”).
70. Doucette, supra note 1, at 426.
71. See Tom Jackman, Virginia Decides Not To Change Rules That
Withhold Documents From Defense, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/va-decides-not-to-changerules-that-withhold-documents-from-defense/2015/12/12/6f76d982-9dc5-11e5bce4-708fe33e3288_story.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2016) (noting that “Virginia’s
prosecutors officially opposed the rule changes” and were relieved when the
Virginia Supreme Court declined to adopt them) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
72. See Doucette, supra note 1, at 427 (providing Doucette’s rationale for
disagreeing with “the Committee’s conclusion that a new subsection requiring
the disclosure of exculpatory evidence should have been added to Rule 3A:11”).
73. Id.
74. 372 U.S. 83 (1963).
75. Doucette, supra note 1, at 427.
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First, Brady does not require the discovery of exculpatory
evidence before a guilty plea.76 Yet the vast majority of
convictions today result from guilty pleas.77 (That is why our
study focused on pre-plea discovery.) In other words, consistent
with Brady, prosecutors may withhold exculpatory evidence, as
long as the defendant eventually decides to plead guilty.78 While
some may respond that a guilty plea indicates actual guilt and
that need for exculpatory evidence is therefore irrelevant, we
know that about 13% of official exonerations have occurred in
cases where defendants pleaded guilty.79
Second, Doucette fails to acknowledge the real possibility
that prosecutors may not recognize a particular piece of evidence
as exculpatory, or that they might take a different view of it than
would a defense attorney—possibilities that many scholars and
commentators have discussed at length.80 Indeed, Doucette’s own
misinterpretations of our findings give weight to this concern. He
reviews the same facts that we did, yet he gave those facts a very
different interpretation. Similar divergences in interpretation are
to be expected when prosecutors and defense attorneys review the
same evidence in a criminal case. To avoid wrongful convictions,
it is therefore important to give defense attorneys access even to
facts that prosecutors themselves believe are incriminating.
Finally, while Doucette assails our methodology for resting
on a non-representative sample, he relies on little more than
anecdote to support his own conclusion that open-file discovery is
too costly and burdensome for prosecutors.81 As we discuss in the
76. See Brady, 372 U.S. at 87; United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–32
(2002).
77. See What Percentage of Felony Convictions Were the Result of a Guilty
Plea?,
BUREAU
OF
JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=405 (last updated Nov. 13, 2016) (last
visited Dec. 9, 2016) (attributing 95% felony convictions to guilty pleas) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 301, 308, 330 n.188 (discussing
cases holding that disclosure of exculpatory information is not required before a
guilty plea).
79. See id. at 289 n.11 (“According to the National Registry of Exoneration,
210 of the 1575 wrongful convictions involved a guilty plea.”).
80. See id. at 300–01 nn.58–62 (reviewing some of the voluminous
literature on this topic).
81. See Doucette, supra note 1, at 429–31 (describing Doucette’s experience
on the Virginia Supreme Court Special Committee).
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article, seventeen states, including large jurisdictions such as
Texas, Florida, and Ohio, have adopted some form of open-file
discovery and have managed to deal with the issues of redactions
and motions for protective orders.82 Since our article was
published, another scholar conducted a quantitative study of
open-file discovery in Texas and North Carolina and found that
open-file in those two states did not lead to a decline in the
number of charges filed per arrest or in reduced sentences.83 This
finding suggests that open-file is not so burdensome as to
interfere with prosecutors’ essential duties, contrary to Doucette’s
anecdote.
In New York, another state that is currently considering
discovery reform, a New York State Bar Association task force
relied heavily on a comparative study of discovery rules and
practices (as well as on comments of practitioners from within
New York) and, like Virginia’s Committee, recommended
liberalizing discovery, while providing for protective orders to
ensure witness safety.84 This conclusion is broadly consistent
with our review of the experiences of Virginia and North Carolina
prosecutors and defense attorneys.
To conclude, we wholeheartedly agree with Baer that
additional empirical work is necessary to test our findings in
different settings and through different methods.85 Some scholars
have already begun this work,86 and more is sure to come. But
our results, based on comparing the responses of hundreds of
practitioners from Virginia and North Carolina, stem from one of
82. Turner & Redlich, supra note 7, at 304.
83. See Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49
CONN. L. REV. *1 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5) (finding “relatively little
evidence that defendants fared significantly better in terms of charging, plea
bargaining, and sentencing . . . as a result of open-file”) (on file with authors).
84. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY,
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 7–8 (2014),
https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=54572 (summarizing
the Task Force’s five general recommendations for criminal discovery reform).
The New York State Bar House of Delegates approved the report on January 30,
2015. Id.
85. See Baer, supra note 2, at 358.
86. See, e.g., Grunwald, supra note 83 (using aggregate administrative data
from North Carolina and Texas criminal cases to compare case processing before
and after the adoption of open-file discovery in each of the two states).
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the most comprehensive studies of pre-plea discovery practices to
date. Our findings point to the same conclusion that both the
New York State Bar Association Task Force on Criminal
Discovery and the Virginia Supreme Court Special Committee on
Criminal Discovery Rules reached. With proper regulation, states
can minimize the logistical burdens and witness safety concerns
of open-file, while ensuring greater fairness and transparency in
the criminal process.

